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Chapter 11
At the Intersection of Science and Faith:  
Epistemic Cognition about “Religiously-Loaded” 
Scientific Issues
Anindito Aditomo
Abstract
Science and religion represent important facets of human experience. Yet, they are re-
lated in complex and sometimes conflicting ways. The present study examines how re-
ligious people think about the science-religion relations by focusing on their epistemic 
cognition, i.e. thoughts about the nature and justification of knowledge when making 
sense of competing claims to truth. The study’s main question was whether people 
express different beliefs with regards to “religiously-neutral” vs. “religiously-loaded” is-
sues in the social-psychological and biological domains. The religiously-neutral issues 
explored were (a) motivation and work performance, and (b) sugar as the cause of 
obesity; while the religiously-loaded issues were (c) homosexuality as a disorder, and 
(d) human evolution. On each of the four issues, undergraduate students from Islamic 
and Christian backgrounds (N = 317; mean age = 21.4 years; 74.1% female) were asked 
to express their epistemic beliefs along the three dimensions: (1) ontology, i.e. whether 
there is a single, objective truth (ontology); (2) fallibility, i.e. whether knowledge of the 
issue could be wrong; and (3) decidability, i.e. whether there are rational ways to decide 
on truth. The findings show when thinking about religiously-loaded scientific issues 
such as homosexuality and evolution, people tend to believe that there is a single ob-
jective truth, that their own beliefs are infallible, and that there is no rational method 
to evaluate knowledge claims. This thinking pattern may be one reason underpinning 
the difficulty of learning about science concepts which are seen to contradict religious 
doctrine. Some implications for science education are also entered into the discussion.
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Conflicts between science and religion present unique challenges for indi-
viduals who wish to maintain a religious identity in the modern world (Roth, 
2010).1 Can faith in religion be reconciled with a belief in science? Can a person 
embrace the scientific worldview, while preserving his/her religious faith?
Such questions can be answered in the affirmative, and with relative ease, 
if only science and religion occupy distinct domains with clear demarcations. 
In this view, science reigns over explanation and manipulation of the natu-
ral world, while religion has authority over moral values and transcendental 
truths. By occupying separate domains, the two can further be imagined as 
being complementary: science is tasked with developing new knowledge and 
technologies, while religion is consulted upon the ethical applications of those 
products of science. Thus, in education systems teaching both science and reli-
gion, the two can unproblematically be taught as separate subjects by different 
teachers. There is little need for science teachers to discuss religious beliefs, 
and vice versa for teachers of religion.
This idyllic picture of the science-religion relationship is, unfortunately, 
incomplete and perhaps even misleading. Science and religion do intersect 
problematically because the sacred texts (at least those from the Abrahamic 
traditions) contain claims about the natural world which can be difficult to 
reconcile with scientific explanations. Two examples of such problematic in-
tersections were examined in this study: claims about the psychiatric status 
of homosexuality, and claims about the origin of the human species (Clark, 
2014). With regards to the first, the Abrahamic religions regard homosexuality 
as an abnormality, which is at odds with the scientific consensus (Halstead 
& Lewicka, 1998; Stm & Gramick, 1989). On the second issue, convention-
al religious teachings maintain that modern humans were created by God 
more-or-less in the present form, and thus reject the theory of evolution. In 
the Indonesian context, the general concept of evolution is included in the 
science curriculum, while the Biblical/Quranic versions are taught in the reli-
gious studies (compulsory for all students, in all schools).
This study seeks to understand the ways people make sense of these 
“religiously-loaded” scientific issues, and whether and how they differ from 
their thinking about more “religiously-neutral” ones. In the following section, 
1   Author Note: Anindito Aditomo, Universitas Surabaya. Correspondence concerning this 
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a brief review of educational research, touching upon the science-religion 
schism, is presented. The review is admittedly selective, but will hopefully suf-
fice to show why understanding people’s thinking about the science-religion 
relationship is essential for education. The next sections then explicate the no-
tion of epistemic cognition, its relevance to understanding how people think 
about the science-religion relationship, as well as the theoretical model used 
in the design of this study.
11.1 Religious Beliefs and Science Education
Educational research on the science-religion relationship has mostly exam-
ined the teaching and learning about human evolution. Data from the recent 
survey in the US show that only a minority of biology teachers in the US con-
sider themselves as advocates of evolutionary theory (Berkman & Plutzer, 
2011). Sixty percent of the teachers endorse neither creationism nor evolution-
ary theory, while a significant minority explicitly advocate for creationism 
(Berkman & Plutzer, 2011). These personal beliefs seem to influence classroom 
pedagogy, with 17% of biology teachers in the US omitting the topic of human 
evolution from their teaching (Berkman, Pacheco, & Plutzer, 2008).
Qualitative studies confirm and further illuminate the influence of teach-
ers’ religious views on their teaching. An interview-based study conducted in 
a Protestant context (Brazil) found that pre-service teachers differed in how 
they negotiate tensions between their religious and scientific knowledge 
(El-Hani & Sepulveda, 2010). Some pre-service teachers recognize that reli-
gious knowledge is as epistemologically distinct from scientific knowledge, 
and thus can see them as serving different facets of the human needs. Those in-
dividuals developed versions of creationism which enabled them to reconcile 
divine creation with the central tenets of evolutionary theory. Another group 
of pre-service teachers, however, deliberately reject and hence exhibit a poor 
understanding of evolutionary theory (El-Hani & Sepulveda, 2010).
A similar study conducted with Muslim pre-service teachers in Egypt re-
sulted in a less diverse picture (Mansour, 2010). That study identified four ways 
in which Muslim pre-service teachers described the relationship between sci-
ence and religion: integration, dialogue, independence, and conflict. All four 
stances, however, subsume scientific knowledge under the domain of religion. 
Thus, science can confirm and enrich religious beliefs, but can never falsify 
them. For all pre-service teachers interviewed, conflicts between science and 
religion will result in a rejection of science. Consequently, they teach evolution 
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in conjunction with creationism, presenting relevant verses from the holy book 
to undermine the veracity of evolutionary theory (Mansour, 2010).
Similarly, religious headmasters of secondary schools in Muslim-majority 
Senegal feel uneasy about having to teach evolutionary theory and the Big Bang 
theory (Croché, 2015). The headmasters respond by teaching about religion (in 
the religious sense) and undermining science through one of the three strate-
gies. The three strategies include presenting science and religious discourses as 
competing “theses”; teaching the official curriculum during formal lessons, but 
expressing their disbelief after class; and merely failing to teach the scientific 
theories, and replacing them with religious explanations about the origin of 
humans and the universe (Croché, 2015).
For the student, the challenge of learning about evolution and other scien-
tific theories which conflict with faith is partly rooted in the biases inherent 
in human cognition. From this cognitive perspective, religion offers explana-
tions, which are more believable than science. In other words, belief in reli-
gion comes more naturally, while scientific theories are more counter-intuitive 
(Blancke, de Smedt, de Cruz, Boudry, & Braeckman, 2012). Unsurprisingly, 
studies show that the strength of students’ religious belief negatively predicts 
their understanding of science (Lawson & Worsnop, 1992; Moore, Brooks, & 
Cotner, 2011). Qualitative studies also show that religious Muslim and Christian 
students do perceive conflicts between evolution and religion, and that explic-
itly discussing epistemological tensions could facilitate deeper understanding 
about evolution (Dagher & BouJaoude, 1997; Yasri & Mancy, 2014).
The tension between science and religion has also played out at the societal 
level. In the US there is a long history of attempts to include versions of cre-
ationism in the science curriculum (Berkman et al., 2008). A similar tug-of-war 
over the content of biology curriculum has occurred in Muslim-majority but 
secular Turkey. While in the US the court has sided with proponents of sci-
ence, the outcome in Turkey has favored the religious faction with the inclu-
sion of an Islamic version of intelligent design theory in the country’s science 
curriculum (Edis, 2009).
Overall, the studies discussed thus far show that religious beliefs influence 
science teaching and learning in significant ways, particularly with regards to 
scientific knowledge which conflict with those beliefs. Addressing this chal-
lenge requires, among other things, a more profound understanding of how 
people think about the relations between science and religion. The current 
study seeks to contribute to developing such an understanding by focusing on 
epistemic cognition, the facet of thought which is fundamental to reasoning 
about conflicting claims to truth.
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11.2 Epistemic Cognition: Development and Key Dimensions
Epistemic cognition can be defined as thought processes which are pertinent 
to the consideration of what counts as valid or believable knowledge (Aditomo, 
2014; William A. Sandoval, Greene, & Bråten, 2016). Epistemic cognition draws 
upon assumptions regarding the nature of knowledge and the processes of 
coming to know. In a seminal article, Kitchener (1983) provided a framework 
to understand the role of epistemic cognition within the more general process 
of problem-solving. In Kitchener’s view, epistemic cognition means a specific 
form of metacognition, one which applies standards about what counts as 
valid knowledge to the task at hand. This view is echoed more recently by other 
researchers (Barbara K. Hofer, 2004; Moshman, 2011).
This specific form of metacognition becomes crucial when dealing with 
ill-structured problems which have multiple, possibly conflicting and po-
tentially equally valid solution paths. For example, in reading a book on the 
science of sexual orientation, an individual may engage in metacognitive 
processes such as monitoring whether she has enough understanding of one 
chapter before deciding to move on to the next. This kind of monitoring is suf-
ficient if the goal is merely to understand the text. However, if the individual is 
reading to decide which side to believe in the debate on homosexuality, then 
she would also need to consider the trustworthiness of the information sourc-
es, the strength of the evidence, the logical connections between different ar-
guments, and so on. In short, she would need to engage in epistemic cognition.
Researchers have documented a general trajectory involving two signifi-
cant shifts in the development of epistemic cognition. Initially, individuals 
subscribe to an objectivist epistemology which sees knowledge as certain and 
absolute truth based upon solid and objective foundation. The first major epis-
temic shift occurs when individuals discard their objectivist epistemology in 
favor of a subjectivist one, which views knowledge as personal and having no 
objective foundation. The second shift occurs when individuals become able 
to reconcile the subjective and objective nature of knowledge, to see it from an 
“evaluativist” stance whereby all claims can and need to be assessed based on 
reason and evidence (Barbara K. Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn & Park, 2005).
While prior studies converge on the trajectory of individuals’ epistemologi-
cal development, there is a wide discrepancy in the timing of key shifts in that 
development. Some studies indicate that the shift from objectivism to subjec-
tivism occur in late adolescence or early adulthood, prompted by the college 
experience (Perry, 1968). Others locate the shift during the early adolescent 
years (Hallett, Chandler, & Krettenauer, 2002), or even during pre-adolescence 
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(Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). These conflicting findings have led re-
searchers to postulate that epistemological development occurs in a contex-
tualized, domain-specific manner. Epistemological development typically 
occurs first in the domain of moral values and personal taste, then the domain 
of the social, and finally the domain of the natural world (Hallett et al., 2002; 
Kuhn et al., 2000). Hence, it should be common to find an adolescent who ex-
presses subjectivist views about moral and social issues, but a more objectivist 
view on scientific issues.
Other researchers have proposed that epistemic cognition is dependent 
upon subtle contextual cues, such that it can vary even within a single domain, 
topic, and activity (Hammer & Elby, 2002). For example, groups of students 
may adopt one epistemic stance when listening to lectures but quickly shift to 
a different stance when given the opportunity to engage in independent inqui-
ry (Rosenberg, Hammer, & Phelan, 2006). Based on such examples, Hammer, 
Elby and colleagues have proposed that epistemic cognition draws upon 
fine-grained ideas which do not necessarily form coherent beliefs or stages of 
development (Hammer, Elby, Scherr, & Redish, 2005).
Another line of research has focused on identifying the main dimensions of 
belief which comprise epistemic cognition. Some models in this tradition por-
tray epistemic cognition as composed of beliefs about the certainty, structure, 
source, and justification of knowledge (Aditomo, 2018; Barbara K. Hofer, 2001; 
W. A. Sandoval, 2009). Other models also incorporate beliefs about the nature 
of learning or knowledge acquisition (Schommer-Aikins, 2004). These multi-
dimensional models attempt to account for the discrepant findings about the 
timing of key epistemic transitions by postulating that epistemological devel-
opment occurs asynchronously across the dimensions. For example, maturity 
in the belief about the certainty of knowledge does not necessarily correlate 
with maturity in the beliefs about sources of or how to justify knowledge 
(Schommer-Aikins, 2004).
11.3 Epistemic Cognition in Cultural and Religious Contexts
Some studies indicate that cultural contexts influence and interact with epis-
temic cognition. For example, a cross-cultural study found that compared to 
their American, European, and African peers, Taiwanese students emphasize 
societal well-being to justify decisions in the face of moral dilemmas (Zeidler, 
Herman, Ruzek, Linder, & Lin, 2013). The authors speculate that the different 
reasoning pattern stems from the more interdependent sense of self which 
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characterize individuals in more collectivist societies (Ziedler et al., 2013). 
Another study (Karabenick & Moosa, 2005) found that compared to their 
Western (US) peers, Middle-eastern students are more likely to trust scien-
tific authorities and to view scientific knowledge as simple and certain (un-
changing). The authors attributed their findings to the traditional religious 
(Islamic) values regarding deference to authorities over independent thinking 
(Karabenick & Moosa, 2005).
The role of religious values and beliefs in epistemic cognition has been ex-
plicated further in a study comparing the views of 5th, 9th, and 12th grade stu-
dents from secular and religious schools with regard to two controversies: first, 
on the existence of God, and second, on whether children need to be punished 
when they misbehave (Gottlieb & Mandel Leadership Institute, 2007). The 
study found that older students tend to be more aware that other people may 
hold opposing beliefs on the two issues, and that there are no objective/ratio-
nal ways to resolve differences in opinion regarding both issues. Comparing 
across the two issues, students were more likely to believe that the God issue 
had a true/correct answer, that there are no rational ways to arrive at that truth, 
and that their views about the issue might be wrong (fallible). Comparing be-
tween religious and secular students, the study also found different epistemic 
orientations with regards to the God controversy, but not for the punishment 
controversy. For the God controversy, religious students were more likely to 
believe that there is only one correct answer (i.e., more realist), that their own 
views are correct (i.e., more infallible) and that there should be rational ways 
to resolve differences in opinion (i.e., more rationalist). This last difference in 
the epistemological orientations of religious and secular students was inter-
preted as evidence that individuals draw from their social-cultural communi-
ties’ ways of knowing (Gottlieb & Mandel Leadership Institute, 2007).
11.4 The Current Study
The current study extends prior research on epistemic cognition by examin-
ing “religiously-loaded” and “religiously-neutral” scientific issues from the 
social-psychological and the biological domains. Religiously-loaded issues deal 
with questions that have been investigated empirically using scientific meth-
ods, but leading to conclusions which contradict religious doctrines. Two such 
issues were examined in this study: whether homosexuality is a psychological 
disorder, and whether evolution can explain the origin of the human species. 
As far as the author is aware of, this is the first study which compares epistemic 
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cognition on such issues with religiously-neutral ones. Thus, the second ques-
tion addressed by this study is whether and how epistemic cognition varies 
across religiously-neutral and religiously-loaded issues.
To address these questions, this study adopted Gottlieb’s model of epistemic 
cognition which focuses on three dimensions of beliefs. The beliefs include 
ontology, i.e. whether there is a single correct answer (realist vs. perspectiv-
ist); fallibility, i.e. whether one’s belief could be wrong (fallibilist vs. infalli-
bilist); and decidability, i.e. whether there are rational ways to decide which 
view is correct (rationalist vs. non-rationalist) (Gottlieb & Mandel Leadership 
Institute, 2007). Based on findings from Kuhn et al. (2000) and Hallett et al. 
(2002), young adults, like the participants of this study, should express more 
objectivist epistemic beliefs with regards to questions about the physical/natu-
ral world (“brute facts”) than the social world (“institutional facts”), compared 
to questions about the social world. Translated into this study’s framework, 
participants should express less perspectivist, less fallibilist, and more ratio-
nalist beliefs when thinking about the biological issues (evolution and obesity) 
compared to the social-psychological issues (homosexuality and motivation).
With regards to differences in epistemic beliefs across religious content, the 
most relevant prior study would be one reported by Gottliet and the Mandel 
Leadership Institute (2007). Indirectly, their findings suggest that individuals 
would be less perspectivist, more fallibilist, and less rationalist concerning re-
ligious issues than non-religious ones. However, Gottlieb’s study focused on 
comparing students from different communities (religious vs. secular schools), 
rather than comparing the same individual with regards to different issues. 
Moreover, the religious claim used in their study (that God exists) can be 
considered as outside the domain of science. In contrast, the current study is 
interested in religious issues which can legitimately be addressed through sci-
entific methods. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the pattern of epistemic 
cognition found in this study replicates those found by (Gottlieb & Mandel 
Leadership Institute, 2007).
11.4.1 Method
11.4.1.1 Design
An online survey was conducted over a period of three months (approximate-
ly September to October 2016) to collect background information as well as 
epistemic orientations with regards to four issues from different judgment do-
mains and with different religious content (motivation, homosexuality, obe-
sity, and evolution; see section on Measures). Prior to the survey, a pilot study 
was conducted by interviewing six students about their epistemic orientations 
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along the three dimensions of ontology, fallibility, and decidability regarding 
the four issues. The purpose was to test whether the issue vignettes could be 
understood and to explore possible answers to questions about the three epis-
temic dimensions of ontology, fallibility, and decidability. These possible an-
swers were incorporated as options in the multiple choice questions designed 
to measure epistemic orientation (see the second column of Table 11.2).
11.4.1.2 Participants
Participants were fourth-year university students from various academic de-
partments in a private university in a metropolitan city in Indonesia. They 
were invited through personal contacts and social media to complete an on-
line survey administered through a Google form. Participation was rewarded 
with a chance to win one of twenty cash prizes (approx. equivalent to 5 to 7 
US dollars) in a lucky draw. Initially, 369 participants completed the online 
survey. Of those, 6 participants who considered themselves to be non-religious 
in response to a screening question were excluded. Also, the analysis only fo-
cused on participants from the Islamic and Christian religions, because these 
religions contain teachings which contradict scientific conclusions about ho-
mosexuality and the evolutionary origins of the human species. This process 
further excluded 46 participants from the Buddhist and Hindu religions. The 
final sample was composed of 317 participants who were on average 21.4 years, 
mostly female (74.1%), and who mostly come from Chinese (48.4%) and 
Javanese (38.8%) ethnic backgrounds. In terms of their academic backgrounds, 
the participants were studying pharmacy (n = 96), psychology (n = 117), engi-
neering (n = 63), business and economics (n = 35), and law (n = 6).
11.4.1.3 Measures
Background questionnaire. A background questionnaire asked participants to 
report their gender, age, ethnic background, and religious affiliation. It also in-
cluded a screening question asking participants to report their level of religios-
ity, going from “not religious”, “religious but somewhat less so than the average 
person”, “just as religious as the average person”, and “more religious than the 
average person”.
Scientific issue vignettes. The main data came from responses to vignettes 
around four issues displayed in Table 11.1. The issues were systematically varied 
along two dimensions: judgment domain (social vs. biological) and religious 
content (“loaded” vs. “neutral”).
Epistemic cognition prompts. Participants were asked whether they agree or 
disagree with the fictitious person’s claim in each issue vignette. They were 
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then presented with close-ended questions assessing orientations regarding 
the three epistemic dimensions examined in this study: “Do you think there 
is one right answer on this issue?” (ontology); “Do you think it is possible that 
your belief about this issue could be wrong?” (fallibility); and “How can you 
rationally determine which answer is correct regarding this issue?” (decidabil-
ity). The response options for each question and their coding are displayed in 
Table 11.2.
11.4.1.4 Analysis
The data was first screened based on participants’ religious affiliation and level 
of religiosity. Only participants from Islamic and Christian (both Catholics and 
Protestants) who consider themselves as religious were included in further 
analysis. For those participants, the analysis was first proceeded by aggregat-
ing responses to the epistemic questions to become dichotomous orientations, 
i.e., perspectivist vs. realist for the ontology dimension, fallibilist vs. infallibilist 
for the fallibility dimension, and rationalist vs. non-rationalist for the decid-
ability dimension. Then, McNemar Chi-Square tests were performed to test 
whether observed differences in the proportion of epistemic orientations for 
each belief dimension were statistically significant. Comparisons were first 
made across domains (social vs. biological issues), but within the type of re-
ligious content, and then across type of religious content (neutral vs. loaded), 
but within each domain. Hence, McNemar tests were performed for 12 com-
parisons (2 domains × 2 religious content × 3 belief dimensions).
Table 11.1 Scientific issue vignettes used as context to assess epistemic cognition
Religious content Domain
Social-psychological Biological
Religiously-neutral Motivation issue: “… claimed 
that motivation is more 
important than skill in 
determining work performance.
Obesity issue: “… claimed 
that sugar instead of fat is 
the main cause of obesity”
Religiously-loaded Homosexuality issue:  
“… claimed that homosexuality 
is not a psychological disorder.”
Evolution issue: “… claimed 
that humans evolved from a 
common ancestor with the 
apes”
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11.4.2 Findings
Descriptive results. Table 11.2 shows the proportion of responses for each ques-
tion assessing epistemic cognition. On the ontology dimension, more partici-
pants adopted a perspectivist rather than a realist orientation for social issues, 
but not for biological issues. On the fallibility dimension, the majority adopted 
a fallibilist orientation for all four issues. There was a clear overall trend in 
the decidability dimension as well: most participants adopted a rationalist ori-
entation. Note that the “consulting religious holy text” option was chosen by 
very few participants with regards to religiously-neutral issues (motivation and 
obesity), but was much more popular with regards to religiously-loaded ones 
(homosexuality and evolution).
Epistemic belief across judgment domains. Comparing across domains for 
the ontological belief dimension, McNemar tests indicate that participants 
were less perspectivist (i.e., more realist) with regards to biological issues com-
pared to social issues. The differences were relatively large, especially for the 
non-religious issues. Differences in the fallibility belief dimension across social 
and biological issues were smaller and only significant for non-religious issues 
(in the hypothesized direction: less fallible for obesity than for motivation). 
In other words, when thinking about the cause of obesity, participants were 
less likely to believe that their views could be wrong, while no such difference 
was observed when comparing fallibility beliefs across the homosexuality 
vs. evolution issues. Differences in decidability beliefs were also modest and 
were statistically significant only for the non-religious issues (again, in the hy-
pothesized direction: participants were more rationalist for obesity than for 
motivation).
Overall, it seems that domains of knowledge serve as a prompt for partici-
pants to adjust their epistemic orientation, especially with regards to the onto-
logical dimension. As hypothesized, participants were less perspectivist (more 
realist), less fallibilist, and more rationalist when considering a biological issue 
than a social one. Furthermore, there was an interaction between domain and 
religious content in prompting epistemic adjustment. For religiously-loaded 
issues, the difference in epistemic orientation about social vs. biological issues 
became less prominent (on the ontological dimension) or disappears (on the 
fallibility and decidability dimensions).
Epistemic belief across religious content. Comparing across religious content 
for the ontological dimension, the analysis indicated that participants were 
less perspectivist (i.e., more realist) with regards to the religiously-loaded 
social issue (homosexuality) than the religiously neutral one (motivation). 
For the biological domain, however, there was no difference in participants’ 
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ontological belief. For the fallibility dimension, participants were less fallibilist 
(i.e., more infallibilist) in their orientation towards religiously-loaded issues 
than for religiously-neutral ones in both the social and biological domains. 
For the decidability dimension, differences in orientations with regards to 
religiously-loaded and neutral issues were even larger, and participants were 
less rationalist (i.e., more non-rationalist) when considering religiously-loaded 
issues.
Overall, the findings indicate that the religious content of an issue also 
prompts shifts in people’s epistemological orientations in all three dimen-
sions. For the ontological dimension, the influence of religious content in-
teracted with the domain, with religiously-loaded content prompting less 
perspectivist (more realist) orientations only within the social domain. For the 
fallibility dimension, religiously-loaded content prompted fewer fallibilist ori-
entations for both domains. For the decidability dimension, religiously-loaded 
content prompted a shift away from rationalist orientations (i.e., towards 
non-rationalist orientations).
Table 11.2 Responses for each option within the three epistemic dimensions
Belief dimension Response options Orientation category Motivation 
issue
Homosexuality 
issue
Obesity issue Evolution issue
Ontology: is there one 
right answer on this 
issue? 
No, the answers regarding this issue are highly personal and cannot 
be compared
Perspectivist 31.9% 27.1% 16.1% 15.8%
No, it is difficult to say that one answer is right because this issue is 
highly subjective
Perspectivist 50.8% 35.0% 25.9% 30.9%
Yes, it is clear that one answer is right and the other is wrong Realist 9.8% 22.7% 36.9% 34.4%
Yes, for this issue, there can be only one right answer Realist 7.6% 15.1% 21.1% 18.9%
Fallibility: could your 
belief be wrong?
No, my belief about this issue cannot be wrong Infallibilist 16.7% 32.2% 22.7% 36.6%
Yes, although unlikely, my belief could still be wrong Fallibilist 59.3% 39.4% 54.3% 38.8%
Yes, it is quite possible that my belief about this issue could be wrong Fallibilist 24.0% 28.4% 23.0% 24.6%
Decidability: what is 
the rational way to 
determine which  
answer is correct? 
There are no rational or objective ways to decide Non-rationalist 5.0% 9.5% 0.6% 8.5%
By consulting the religious holy texts Non-rationalist 0.9% 27.1% 0.9% 30.0%
By examining empirical facts/evidence Rationalist 50.8% 13.9% 13.9% 15.1%
By considering the judgments of experts in the relevant academic 
fields
Rationalist 9.5% 30.3% 65.0% 24.3%
By using logic to analyze and further examine the issue Rationalist 33.8% 19.2% 19.6% 22.1%
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Table 11.3 McNemar Chi-square tests comparing social and biological issues
Issues  
compared
Ontology Fallibility Decidability
% difference Chi square % difference Chi square % difference Chi square
Motivation vs. 
Obesity
40.69% 103.36 
(p < .0001)
5.99% 4.06
(p = .0440)
4.42% 8.17
(p = .004)
Homosexuality 
vs. Evolution
15.46% 19.21 
(p < .0001)
4.42% 1.92
(p = .1980)
1.89% 0.35
(p = .556)
Table 11.2 Responses for each option within the three epistemic dimensions
Belief dimension Response options Orientation category Motivation 
issue
Homosexuality 
issue
Obesity issue Evolution issue
Ontology: is there one 
right answer on this 
issue? 
No, the answers regarding this issue are highly personal and cannot 
be compared
Perspectivist 31.9% 27.1% 16.1% 15.8%
No, it is difficult to say that one answer is right because this issue is 
highly subjective
Perspectivist 50.8% 35.0% 25.9% 30.9%
Yes, it is clear that one answer is right and the other is wrong Realist 9.8% 22.7% 36.9% 34.4%
Yes, for this issue, there can be only one right answer Realist 7.6% 15.1% 21.1% 18.9%
Fallibility: could your 
belief be wrong?
No, my belief about this issue cannot be wrong Infallibilist 16.7% 32.2% 22.7% 36.6%
Yes, although unlikely, my belief could still be wrong Fallibilist 59.3% 39.4% 54.3% 38.8%
Yes, it is quite possible that my belief about this issue could be wrong Fallibilist 24.0% 28.4% 23.0% 24.6%
Decidability: what is 
the rational way to 
determine which  
answer is correct? 
There are no rational or objective ways to decide Non-rationalist 5.0% 9.5% 0.6% 8.5%
By consulting the religious holy texts Non-rationalist 0.9% 27.1% 0.9% 30.0%
By examining empirical facts/evidence Rationalist 50.8% 13.9% 13.9% 15.1%
By considering the judgments of experts in the relevant academic 
fields
Rationalist 9.5% 30.3% 65.0% 24.3%
By using logic to analyze and further examine the issue Rationalist 33.8% 19.2% 19.6% 22.1%
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11.4.3 Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to understand how epistemic cognition about 
scientific issues vary across judgment domains and religious content. This was 
done by asking religious, highly educated young adults to report their epis-
temic orientations about four issues: whether motivation is more important 
than skill in determining work performance; whether homosexuality is a psy-
chological disorder; whether sugar is the primary cause of obesity; and wheth-
er humans are the product of evolution.
Figure 11.1 Epistemic orientations about religiously-loaded and neutral issues
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Table 11.4 McNemar chi-square tests comparing religiously-loaded and neutral issues
Issues  
compared
Ontology Fallibility Decidability
% difference Chi square % difference Chi square % difference Chi square
Motivation vs. 
Homosexuality
20.50% 33.30 
(p < .0001)
15.46% 21.14 
(p < .0001)
30.60% 83.03 
(p < .0001)
Obesity vs. 
Evolution
4.73% 1.41  
(p = .24)
13.88% 14.78 
(p = .0001)
36.91% 107.65
(p < .0001)
With regards to variations across domains, the findings show that people are 
more realist, infallibilist, and rationalist with regards to biological issues than 
social ones. In other words, people are more likely to believe that there are 
objective truths which can be rationally justified when thinking about issues 
such as the cause of obesity and human evolution, than issues such as work 
motivation and sexual orientation. They are also more certain about the cor-
rectness of their personal views regarding biological than social issues. This 
pattern is consistent with prior studies which show that shifts from an objec-
tivist to a subjectivist epistemology occur earlier with regards to “institutional 
facts” about the social world, than for “brute facts” about the natural world 
(Hallett et al., 2002; Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). The current 
study lends further empirical support for this developmental pattern using 
topics which have not yet been utilized for this purpose.
In addition to reinforcing previous theories, the current study also pro-
duced new insights about how epistemic cognition on scientific issues varies 
across religious content. The findings indicate that religious content influ-
enced epistemic cognition in systematic ways. For scientific issues which are 
“religiously-loaded” (homosexuality and evolution), people are less likely to 
acknowledge the possibility of multiple truths, more likely to be convinced 
that their views are correct, and less likely to believe that there are rational 
ways of evaluating competing claims. This pattern is partly consistent with a 
prior study of Israeli students, which found that students were less likely to be 
perspectivists and more likely to be non-rationalists about whether God exists, 
than about whether children should be punished for misbehavior (Gottlieb & 
Mandel Leadership Institute, 2007).
Interestingly, however, the findings of the current study differ from Gottlieb’s 
concerning the fallibility dimension. Unlike the students in Gottlieb’s study, 
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participants of this study were less fallibilist (i.e., less likely to see the possibil-
ity of being mistaken) about religiously-loaded scientific issues than neutral 
ones. This contrast may be due to some yet to be identified socio-cultural dif-
ferences. For instance, compared to Indonesian students, Israeli students may 
be more exposed to radically different ideas about religious topics (including 
the existence of God), such that they are more at ease in acknowledging the 
fallibility of their beliefs. For the Indonesian context, secular views about ho-
mosexuality and the origin of humans have yet to become part of mainstream 
discourse. As such, Indonesians have fewer discursive resources to draw on 
when thinking about those issues. Further research needs to be done to exam-
ine whether these conjectures have any merit.
These findings are relevant to theoretical issues about the nature and de-
velopment of epistemic cognition. According to one view, highly educated 
young adults (such as those who participated in this study) should already 
have moved away from an objectivist epistemology towards a subjectivist one. 
Some should even have shifted from a subjectivist epistemology to an evalu-
ativist one, which is considered to be the most advanced stage of development 
in many models (Greene, Azevedo, & Torney-Purta, 2008; Barbara K. Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). In the framework of this study, an 
evaluativist epistemology would be characterized by the view that there can be 
multiple truths (perspectivism), that one’s knowledge could be wrong (fallibil-
ism), and that there are rational ways of determining the validity of knowledge 
claims (rationalism). This was indeed the general trend found in this study (see 
Table 11.2). However, this study also concurs with the suggestions that epis-
temic development does not occur “wholesale”. Instead, epistemic develop-
ment seems to occur in a more contextual and fragmented fashion (Hammer 
& Elby, 2002). As previous studies have shown, an aspect of context which is 
important for epistemic development is the judgment domain (Hallett et al., 
2002; Barbara K. Hofer, 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005). This study further shows that 
even within the same domain, religious content acts as a contextual cue which 
influences epistemic cognition.
One question which arises from these findings is why people become less 
perspectivist, fallibilist, and rationalist when thinking about religiously-loaded 
issues. One possibility is that scientific knowledge on such issues poses a threat 
to religious individuals’ worldview and identity. For religious individuals in a 
religious society, adopting the epistemic orientations observed in this study 
may serve to affirm and protect valued parts of their worldview and identity. 
That is, believing that homosexuality is a disorder, or that God created humans 
in our modern form, affirms their worldview. This worldview is further pro-
tected by believing that there are no rational ways to decide between religious 
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faith and scientific knowledge (hence, pre-empting the possibility of finding 
evidence which undermines those worldviews). If true, this means that when 
thinking of religiously-loaded scientific issues, epistemic cognition functions 
to serve motivated reasoning whose goal is primarily non-epistemic (pursuing 
not truth, but self-related goals, see (Sinatra, Kienhues, & Hofer, 2014)). Future 
research could explore this possibility qualitatively using in-depth interviews 
or quantitatively using models which explicitly include religiosity and goals 
of reasoning.
Another question this study raises is about what should count as sophis-
ticated epistemic cognition (i.e., the end points of epistemic development). 
Normatively speaking, should epistemic development always move away from 
objectivism towards subjectivism, and ultimately to evaluativism? Alterna-
tively, considering that epistemic cognition seems to be embedded within 
socio-cultural communities, should the end points of epistemic development 
be expected to vary across communities (Gottlieb & Mandel Leadership Insti-
tute, 2007)? The answer to this question may also be contextual. If one’s family 
or community upholds the view that there are absolute truths about theo-
logical matters, perhaps it would be more socially adaptive for an individual 
also to adopt an objectivist epistemology about those matters. However, the 
same epistemology may be less adaptive in academic contexts, which expect 
individual to develop conceptual understanding about scientific concepts that 
may go against religious doctrine.
Implications. If students believed only on a single truth which is justified 
non-rationally and cannot be wrong, then it would not be surprising that they 
find it difficult to develop a deep understanding about scientific concepts 
which go against their personal beliefs. This challenge has been well docu-
mented in the case of learning about evolution (Blancke et al., 2012; Lawson 
& Worsnop, 1992; Moore et al., 2011). By way of analogy, similar challenges 
may impede learning about sexual orientation for students of psychology 
and psychiatry. Hence, direct competition between science and religion may 
not be the most productive way forward. That is, presenting scientific knowl-
edge as the ultimate truth to replace religious beliefs about matters such as 
human evolution and homosexuality may lead to the rejection of science 
altogether. As prior studies have shown, many teachers in religious societ-
ies tend to undermine or de-legitimize scientific knowledge which are per-
ceived to conflict with religious faith (Croché, 2015; El-Hani & Sepulveda, 2010; 
Mansour, 2010).
How, then, should educators address this challenge? If part of the difficulty 
is indeed underpinned by epistemic cognition, then addressing it would need 
to involve stimulating epistemic growth. For example, it may be important 
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for teachers to help students to see multiple truths (become less realist and 
more fallibilist) on various matters. It may also be important to develop stu-
dents’ intellectual humility and acknowledge that one’s belief could be wrong, 
even when it is founded upon religious texts. Students may perhaps need to 
develop the belief that there are legitimate methods to evaluate competing 
claims, even if those methods cannot provide access to an objective reality or 
absolute truths. To overcome the challenges associated with negotiating ten-
sions between science and religion, this kind of epistemic development likely 
needs to occur with regards to religion as well as science. In other words, in the 
context of religious societies, reform is needed simultaneously in the teaching 
of religion and science.
Conclusions. Overall, it can be concluded that not only is epistemic cogni-
tion about scientific issues sensitive to variations in judgment domains, but 
also to variations in religious content. On matters where religious claims con-
flict with scientific knowledge, people tend to adopt a more objectivist episte-
mology typified by realist, infallibilist, and non-rationalist orientations. While 
this pattern of epistemic cognition may be socially or culturally adaptive in the 
context of religious communities, it may represent a significant barrier to the 
learning and teaching in some areas of science.
Limitations and future research. In considering the findings and conclusions 
of this study, readers should be aware of several limitations. Methodologically, 
this study measured epistemic cognition using a nominal scale, thus limiting 
the analysis which could be performed. The model used in this study (which 
included three dimensions of epistemic orientations: ontology, fallibility, and 
decidability) proved to be fruitful to capture meaningful variations in people’s 
responses. Hence, future studies should attempt to assess the three epistemic 
dimensions using either more in-depth qualitative methods or using quantita-
tive instruments which could yield data at the interval level of measurement. 
Another methodological limitation was the order of presentation of the four 
issues. In this study, all participants received the issues in the same order (mo-
tivation, homosexuality, evolution, and then obesity). Although remote, the 
order of presentation may have biased responses in systematic ways. Future 
studies should examine whether the findings replicate when the order of pre-
sentation is controlled/counter-balanced. Last, this study was designed to serve 
exploratory purposes. The study succeeded in finding meaningful patterns of 
epistemic cognition, but could not provide insights as to why such patterns 
exist. Qualitative studies using interviews and/or observations of cognition-in-
action would be useful for further understanding of why certain epistemic be-
liefs are adopted with regards to religiously-loaded scientific issues.
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